A Model for Afghanistan’s Cyber Security Incident Response Team by Jalal, Islahuddin et al.
  
 
Vol.8 (2018) No. 6 
ISSN: 2088-5334 
A Model for Afghanistan’s Cyber Security Incident Response Team  
Islahuddin Jalal#1, Maryati Mohd Yusof#2, Zarina Shukur#3, Mohd. Rosmadi Mokhtar#4  
#Center for Software Technology and Management, Faculty of Information Science and Technology 
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 43600 Bangi, Malaysia 
E-mail: 1islahuddinjalal@yahoo.com, {2zarinashukur, 3Maryati.Yusof, 4mrm}@ukm.edu.my 
 
 
Abstract— Persistent cyber threats require effective and efficient mitigation techniques. The cyber security incident response team 
(CSIRT) is expected to respond to external and internal cyber threats or incidents. Various organizational, national, and international 
level CSIRTs have been developed for defending and protecting such kinds of threats. Developing countries like Afghanistan have also 
formed a Computer Emergency Response Team for handling national cyber incidents although it provides limited services to only a few 
constituencies and depends on funding from foreign donors. Therefore, a new organizational model was proposed to provide guidelines 
for a specific country, instead of a provision from a constitutional context. Five national CSIRTs were compared to identify their 
features and characteristics to provide basis for the proposed framework.  The study presented the proposed model based on two 
CSIRT organizational models that incorporated a new funding strategy to achieve a Sustainable National CSIRT for developing 
countries. Our model combined coordinate and security teams; if consists of constituency’s mission, services, resources, organizational 
framework, and funding strategy. This study employed qualitative method by using document analysis and interview techniques. 
CSIRT for Afghanistan known as AFCERT was evaluated in terms of structure, services, resources, and funding.  AFCERT services 
level were below the standard of a national CSIRT. Therefore, a more sustainable service need to be provided based on the proposed 
model components. Findings showed the suitability and potential of the model in controlling and mitigating cyber-attacks, more 
specifically in the context of Afghanistan. 
Keywords—CSIRT; cyber security, cyber-attacks, cyber policy. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Cyber Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) 
plays a significant role as the backbone of a country’s 
cybersecurity infrastructure. It manages all types of cyber 
incidents such as financial crime, political crime, internet 
fraud, and cyber pornography [1]. According to Hammond 
[2], more than 4000 ransomware attacks and 230000 new 
malware produced every day. Some national CSIRTs have 
been developed globally. Afghanistan’s Computer 
Emergency Response Team (AFCERT) has been providing 
services to its constituencies by closely cooperating with law 
enforcement agencies to combat cyber crimes in the country 
and create awareness in the government and private sector 
[3], [4].  
However, AFCERT is confined to law enforcement 
agencies and focuses mainly on legal aspects. Moreover, it 
does not cover constituencies as done by the national 
CSIRT. The current funding strategy adopted by AFCERT 
seems to be temporary because it relies on foreign donors, 
which is not sustainable. Therefore, consideration should be 
given to funding strategies for the national CSIRT in 
Afghanistan. Afghanistan faces some cyber threats, namely 
access to government data, threats to financial organizations 
and critical national information infrastructure, hacking, 
virus distribution, computer system tampering and data 
privacy issues. A CSIRT for Afghanistan is imperative in 
order to combat, protect and defend its cyberspace 
efficiently and effectively.   
Numerous studies have defined CSIRT, but they all share 
the same theme. Ruefle et al. [5] defined it as “a concrete 
organizational entity or capability that has been assigned the 
concern of providing a portion of the incident management 
capability for a particular organization.” According to 
Killcrece [6], CSIRT “is a service organization responsible 
for receiving, reviewing and responding to computer security 
incident reports and activities in its constituency.” This study 
had defined merely CSIRT as a group of experts who can 
protect and mitigate cyber-attacks on critical national 
infrastructure, public and private sectors, as well as people. 
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A CSIRT has various sizes, nature, and scope. Killcrece 
[6] categorized it according to purpose, function, services, 
structure, and sector. Zajicek [7] classified CSIRT based on 
its internal structure, coordination and analysis center, 
vendor security team and incident response provider. 
Bradshaw [8] classify CSIRT based on the Parent 
organization such as National CSIRTs, Private CSIRTs, and 
Technical or Academic CSIRTs. According to [9] no two 
CSIRTs are the same. There are some similarities and 
differences exist in the CSIRTs. These differences may be 
due to the several factors such as CSIRT type, organization 
type (e.g., manufacturing company, university), size of the 
CSIRT and Kind of services they offer. CSIRT can be 
categorized according to its geographical circle because the 
cyber world has no borders or limits. For example, the 
category consists of organizational CSIRTs (e.g., military, 
community, and institutional), national CSIRTs (e.g., 
Malaysia, Australia, and India), and international CSIRTs 
(e.g. For Inspiration and Recognition of Science and 
Technology (FIRST), Asia Pacific Computer Emergency 
Response Team (APCERT), CERT@VDE which focuses on 
the CSIRT services to SME to address the gap in trust and 
capabilities in security [10] and Organization of the Islamic 
Conference Computer Emergency Response Team (OIC-
CERT)). 
A. Major Components of CSIRT 
CSIRT is made up of six crucial pillars that influence 
each other [6], namely mission, constituency, organizational 
framework, resources, services, and funding. 
1) Mission: One of the most critical organizational 
statements that indicate future direction. It should be 
pragmatic, flexible, concise and related to the core services 
that CSIRT provides to its constituencies [11]. 
2) Constituency: A defined group that is served by 
CSIRT [6], such as a parent organization, government 
ministry, institution, community or organization within a 
specific geographical boundary. A constituency can be 
bounded or unbounded [5], which refers to the limited 
service offered by CSIRT. According to [15] most of the 
constituency are bounded and provide services to those who 
are providing funding. The constituency definition for 
CSIRT is challenging [5]. Once the constituency is defined 
and understood, it will be easy to understand and determine 
how to protect the assets in these places [5]. This will 
provide an insight on the services provided by the CSIRT, 
mainly referring to the teamwork involved. This information 
will guide in determining the most suitable CSIRT 
organizational model [6]. 
3) Organizational framework: The overall structure of 
the CSIRT consist of its physical location, reporting 
infrastructure, job requirements, interaction with a 
constituency as well as within the team, authority and 
internal and external information flow of the CSIRT. The 
formation of the organizational framework depends on 
mission, objectives, necessity, and services of the 
organization in different constituency [15]. 
4) Resources: This comprises staff (Technical/ Non-
technical) and equipment (Software/ Hardware). Killcrece 
and Ruefle [12] recommended various equipment for 
CSIRT, which included the telephone, fax machine, office 
computing systems, laptops, projectors, notification systems, 
electronic whiteboards, VPNs, SSH (Secure Shell) or digital 
certificates, software including operating systems, lab 
devices, intranet, test network, web, firewalls, servers, 
databases, routers, switches, monitoring tools, media and 
infrastructure (space, furniture, power, and transportation).  
5) Services: Every CSIRT offers different services or 
functions based on its nature, culture, environment, expertise 
available, funding [5] and needs. Services are classified 
according to 1) reactive (alerts and warnings, incident 
handling, vulnerability handling and artefact handling); 2) 
proactive (announcements, security assessments, 
development of security tools, intrusion detection services 
and security-related information dissemination); 3) quality 
management (risk analysis, disaster recovery planning, 
security consulting, awareness building, education/ training 
and product evaluation) [5]; and 4) long-term resiliency 
(knowledge sharing for critical infrastructure guidelines, 
advisories), research and education, point of contact 
(responsible disclosure) [13]. 
6) Fund: This could be considered as the nucleus of the 
CSIRT. The fund should be obtained for start-up as well as 
short and long-term operations [5], which includes initial 
staffing, short and long-term professional development, 
training, equipment, tools, network infrastructure for 
detecting, tracking, analysing, and responding to cyber 
issues, as well as securing and facilitating CSIRT (data, 
system, staff). Different fund strategies for CSIRT have been 
described in the handbook [12]. Many national CSRITs do 
not publish the funding sources and specification because of 
unclear structures in the public domain [16]. Some CSIRTs 
are provided a fund for the services it offers by some other 
organization or entity [2]. Some of the examples of funding 
strategies for national and organizational CSIRTs are 
described in Table 1. Different countries have different 
funding strategies and models. 
 
TABLE I 
DIFFERENT FUNDING STRATEGIES FOR CSIRT      
Funding strategies Country or Organization 
Membership Subscription AusCERT (Australia) 
Fee-based Services MYCERT (Malaysia) 
Contract Services IBM, ISS, CISCO, Consulting firms 
Government Sponsorship US-CERT (USA) 
Academic or Research 
Sponsorship 
SURFcert, NORDUnet CERT 
Parent Organizing Funding Cisco PSIRT 
Consortium Sponsorship Group or organizations, government 
entities, universities 
Combination of the above CERT/CC 
Funded Voluntarily bdCERT (Bangladesh) 
Domain Name Registration CGI.br (Brazil) 
B. Existing Organizational Model of CSIRT 
Studies on the organizational model of CSIRT are limited. 
Carnegie Mellon University has been playing a leading role 
in the development of CSIRT guidelines, notes, and 
handbook. Killcerce [6] focused on CSIRT’s physical 
location, dependence, and constituency interaction as well as 
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reporting infrastructure and mechanism for internal and 
external information flow. We analyzed five organizational 
models for CSIRT, as featured in the study by Killcerce [6], 
namely the security team model, internal distributed model, 
centralized model, combination of centralized and 
distributed model, and coordinated model [14]. 
C. Comparison between Four Other National CSIRTs 
Some national CSIRTs have been developed since 1988 
for safeguarding and protecting its critical infrastructure, 
financial institutions, as well as public and private sectors 
from cyber-attacks. According to [16] 89 countries, as well 
as European Union (EU), have developed national CSIRTs 
yet. All national CSIRTs have similar aims but with a slight 
difference regarding providing services, constituencies with 
different cultures and religions, availability of expertise and 
resources, as well as the type of cyber-attacks and its 
magnitude and intensity. Since the primary aim of this study 
was to support the work of proposing a new CSRIT model 
for Afghanistan, four national CSIRTs were reviewed to 
identify their relevant features based on these justifications:   
• MyCERT (Malaysia): An Islamic country with similar 
Islamic culture, values, and attitudes as Afghanistan.  
• CERT-In (India): Has a very close political 
relationship with Afghanistan.  
• CNCERT (China): A neighboring country with 
Afghanistan.  
• US-CERT (United States of America): the USA has 
signed a bilateral security agreement with Afghanistan  
MyCERT and US-CERT are concerned about Internet 
security, while CERT-In [17] and CNCERT [18] highlighted 
its critical infrastructure. Exchanging information to the rest 
of the world is an essential aspect of US-CERT. MyCERT’s 
primary sponsor is the government; however, since it also 
provides services to the public, it can provide fee-based 
services that help them to cater to both the public and private 
sectors. CERT-In is also sponsored by the government and 
provides services mostly to the government, academic 
institutions, and related industries. CNCERT is proactive 
and focuses more on the security of critical national 
infrastructure, instead of people at large as shown in 
MyCERT and US-CERT. International cooperation is also 
vital to CNCERT. US-CERT declared critical infrastructure 
as their stakeholders and highlighted the importance of 
collaboration with other parties. 
In order to construct a sustainable national CSIRT, four 
strategic goals need to be achieved [19]: 
• Plan and establish the capability to manage security 
incidents (engage stakeholders; understand 
constraints; location/ reporting; authority)  
• Establish situational awareness (build trust; recognize 
the dual role of the CSIRT; operational capabilities; 
use existing national CSIRT as a resource) 
• Manage cyber incidents (operational capabilities; use 
existing national CSIRTs as resources) 
• Support the national cybersecurity strategy (in the 
absence of a national cybersecurity strategy; identify a 
sponsor for a national CSIRT). 
 
 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
This study employed qualitative methods via document 
analysis and email interviews using the purposive sampling 
method.  Email interviews were carried out iteratively with 
three informants (Table 2) from the Ministry of 
Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) of 
Afghanistan. AFCERT is the only CSIRT in the country and 
has only two departments, namely the Cyber Awareness and 
Cyber Crime Forensics Departments that comprises the three 
informants above. They have vast experience in managing 
cyber-crimes in the country. The interview aimed to identify 
the status, infrastructure and major components required for 
CSIRT and how the AFCERT handles cyber incidents in 
Afghanistan. The interview questions were designed based 
on the major components of CSIRT, namely mission, 
constituency, services, resources, organizational framework, 
and fund.  
 
TABLE II 
INFORMANT’S PROFILE 
Designation Educational 
Background 
Work 
Experience 
Information Cyber 
Security Director 
MSc in Computer 
Security 
6yrs 
General Manager (GM) 
of Cyber Awareness 
Department  
BSc in Computer 
Science 
4yrs 
GM of Cyber Crimes 
Forensic Department  
BSc in Computer 
Science 
5yrs 
  
Document analysis was conducted on documents related 
to Afghanistan’s cyber threat and AFCERT including 
government officials report, official documents of 
international CSIRT, Critical Information Infrastructure 
Protection and Cyber Security report, and existing CSIRT 
model. Data were analyzed manually using the instructed 
content analysis technique. Field notes were examined by 
identifying the main elements that were categorized based on 
the proposed framework.   
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. AFCERT 
AFCERT has been actively functioning since 2009 as a 
first responder for combating and mitigating cybercrimes in 
the country. It is centrally located and under the auspices of 
the Information and Cyber Security Directorate of the 
Ministry of Communication and Information Technology 
(MCIT). It works round the clock to provide services to its 
constituencies, closely cooperating with law enforcement 
agencies and creating awareness in the government and 
private sectors. When cyber incidents occur, the 
constituencies report to the AFCERT through a formal letter 
or email. Then the AFCERT provides feedback to the 
constituencies and files the report for future investigation. 
AFCERT works closely with law enforcement agencies, and 
most of its cases are confidential. Therefore, it does not 
publish nor possess a formal mechanism for periodically 
publishing official reports on threats, crimes, or 
vulnerabilities for the public. So, the cybersecurity 
challenges across all areas of human life are in such 
magnitude and complexity that the current policy responses 
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are closed and led only by governments are not sufficient 
and may increase the number of collateral damage. [20] 
1) The constituency of AFCERT: AFCERT provides 
services to law enforcement agencies and creates awareness 
for the government and private sectors. AFCERT does not 
include constituencies like other national CSIRTs. 
Therefore, it is necessary for Afghanistan to develop a 
national CSIRT to combat and defend its cyberspace 
effectively and efficiently. 
2) Services by AFCERT: AFCERT provides the following 
services to its constituencies (Table 3). 
TABLE III 
 AFCERT SERVICES 
Reactive 
Services 
Proactive Services Security Quality 
Management Services 
Response 
on-site 
• Vulnerability 
assessment 
• Penetration testing 
• Information Security 
Audit 
• Support entities by 
writing security 
policies and 
procedures 
 
 “AFCERT services are mainly in response to the crime 
scene, conduct information security audit, vulnerability 
assessment of networks, penetration testing, and support 
entities by specifying their security policies and procedures” 
(ICSD Director). AFCERT does not share its cybersecurity 
information with its constituencies or other national CSIRTs 
due to unavailable connection meant for coordination and 
cooperation – “due to political instability we are not able to 
connect our NOC with international partners, but for now we 
are using online information to obtain the latest updates on 
cyber alerts” (GM CAD). 
Information sharing, coordination, and cooperation with 
other local and national CSIRTs are the core services of a 
national CSIRT, but these services are lacking in the 
AFCERT. Compared to other national CSIRTs, the services 
provided by the AFCERT are not up to the standard of a 
national CSIRT. This calls for the enhancement of 
sustainable services that fulfill the requirements of a national 
CSIRT for Afghanistan. 
3) Resources of AFCERT: AFCERT has limited resources 
comprising: 
• Staff (ICSD director, 4 CCFD members, and 3 CCAD 
members) 
• Equipment (e.g., Furniture, Computers/ laptops, 
Internet, Telephone, OS, DNS, Web Server, 
Workstation, Antivirus software, forensic lab) 
• Infrastructure (e.g.: CCFD, CCAD, Power, 
Transportation) 
4) Fund of AFCERT: Similar to other national CSIRTs, 
Afghanistan also receives funding from the government and 
the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which is one of the donors working towards the 
rebuilding and rehabilitation of Afghanistan. According to 
the ICSD Director, “AFCERT is using the government 
budget for its sustainability and improvement. Every year we 
estimate the budget and send the proposal to the Ministry of 
Finance. There is no other source available for AFCERT 
except one from the e-Government resource center funded 
by USAID”.  
The current funding strategy for AFCERT is not 
sustainable due to the reliance on foreign donors. A national 
CSIRT should be fully funded by its government or other 
means to fulfill its requirements. Therefore, a focused 
consideration should be given towards funding strategies for 
a sustainable national CSIRT for Afghanistan. 
B. CSRIT 
This study proposed a Central Coordinate Contributed-
CSRIT (3C-CSIRT) model that combined coordinate and 
security teams (Figure 1). The respective constituency’s role 
is highly engaged by sharing its expertise and budget. This 
study attempted to improve the sustainable funding issue and 
limited technical expertise. As 3C-CSIRT is a national 
CSIRT so, therefore, should not be part of either Intelligence 
institution or law enforcement agencies and do not report 
directly to either of them [16]. The significant components 
of 3C-CSIRT are the constituency’s mission, services, 
resources, organizational framework, and funding strategy. 
The components were identified from the literature and 
validated through interviews and document analysis. 
 
 
 
Fig.1. Proposed CSIRT Model 
1) 3C-CSIRT Constituency: The constituencies in this 
model follow the critical sectors in Afghanistan [21], they 
include financial sectors, government ministries, law 
enforcement agencies and the Internet Society of 
Afghanistan. 
Major Components of 3C-CSIRT Model 
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2) 3C-CSIRT Organizational Framework: As the 3C-
CSIRT is a combination of the central coordinate model and 
security team, it has both a dedicated as well as an ad hoc 
team for its parent constituency. The dedicated team works 
for all the constituencies of the 3C-CSIRT, while the ad hoc 
team works only for its parent organization and handles 
cyber incidents on-site while sharing the incidents with the 
central 3C-CSIRT. 3C-CSIRT has a central location, a 
manager, and a steering committee (SC). SC comprises the 
head of ISO, CIO, IT and CSO in the constituencies. The 
constituencies must be large enough with branches or offices 
covering more than half of all the Afghanistan provinces. 
The 3C-CSIRT involves staff with skills and expertise in all 
systems and platforms supported by the constituency. 
However, 3C-CSIRT is a national team that covers the entire 
cyber society in the country and runs its operations round the 
clock. Therefore, its role is to advise and support the 
constituencies that do not have security teams. It is 
authoritative to some extent in the presence of security teams 
from the respective constituencies. The 3C-CSIRT should 
act neutral and be impartial to all constituencies. It is 
obvious that large, geographically dispersed constituencies 
cannot reasonably provide an appropriate direct incident 
response at the site [6]. Therefore, the function of the 
security team would be to fill this gap in the proposed 
model.  
3) 3C-CSIRT Reporting Mechanism and Communication: 
The focal point in this model should be the office of the 3C-
CSIRT manager for internal and external entities to 
coordinate and render support since the manager is 
responsible for controlling and managing the 3C-CSIRT 
technical staff and provide reports to the steering committee. 
The 3C-CSIRT should have a proper reporting mechanism 
for its constituencies in order to respond and support them 
without delay. There should be a helpdesk centrally located 
in 3C-CSIRT, which is responsible for collecting incident 
reports from its constituencies through multiple modes of 
communication such as mobile phones, email, Internet, fax, 
fixed line and secure communication channels (for internal 
reporting). The security team will report security incidents 
using their secure communication channel to the 3C-CSIRT 
helpdesk to keep track of incidents occurring in the country 
for further investigation. This will help to prevent recurring 
incidents in other constituencies and also help in publishing 
annual, quarterly or monthly incidents or reports for the 
public.  
4) 3C-CSIRT Authority: As discussed earlier, the 3C-
CSIRT’s role is to advise and support constituencies without 
security teams while being authoritative to some extent in 
the presence of security teams from the respective 
constituencies. 3C-CSIRT has temporary operational 
authority over all constituencies in the case of emergency, 
risky, or critical incidents.  
5) 3C-CSIRT Operational Support: 3C-CSIRT is 
responsible for providing operational support to the security 
team in the constituencies and also those who do not have a 
security team. 3C-CSIRT provides technical and practical 
guidance [5] throughout an incident’s life cycle, from 
identification, analysis, containment, eradication, and 
recovery in order to defend and protect assets from cyber 
incidents efficiently and effectively. 
6) 3C-CSIRT Information Flow: Incoming information 
might include situational awareness and incident detection 
[12], while outgoing information might involve the relative 
responses. The source and destination of both flows need to 
be considered. The incoming information might specifically 
comprise reports received, data from network logging or 
monitoring devices such as IDS, or secret information from 
other organizations including National Defence Services 
(NDS) and law enforcement sectors and sharing information 
with other CSIRTs and security organizations within and 
outside the 3C-CSRIT constituency. Examples of outgoing 
information include alerts, advisories, security guidance and 
documentation, awareness information, or formal briefings 
and reports going to management and business lines [5]. 
7) 3C-CSIRT Services: Some of the services include 
incident and vulnerability handling, knowledge sharing 
(guidance, advisories), security-related information 
dissemination, awareness building, education/ training, 
monitoring, penetration testing and audit, as well as 
translation services. Incident handling means the response to 
cyber incidents or events requested or reported by 
constituencies [6]. Incident handling includes protecting, 
defending, mitigating, and controlling the risk of cyber 
incidents that affect the system or network. The 
advancement and production of more and smarter devices 
for the internet of Things (IoT) will pose more risks 
alongside new attack surfaces is going to be exposed in 
autonomous systems such as self-driving vehicles [22]. The 
incident handling activities are categorized as follows [6]: 
• Incident and Vulnerability Analysis. The 3C-CSIRT 
analyses the reported incident to determine the origin, the 
tool used in the attack, the scope of the attack, the 
vulnerability that was exploited, provide a strategy for 
incident recovery and mitigating as well as performing 
an in-depth analysis on the affected system with the help 
of the security team from the 3C-CSIRT constituencies. 
The analysis is performed in order to understand the 
overall security position of the constituencies. 
• Incident and Vulnerability Response Support. Response 
on sites, such as answering questions through the 
telephone, mobile phones, email or other communication 
tools, provides results by researching incidents and 
vulnerabilities, tracking and maintaining the history of 
incidents and vulnerabilities that could be accessed by 
the constituencies and provide technical reports. 
• Incident and Vulnerability Response Coordination. A 
dedicated team provides comprehensive tracking, 
recording, and dissemination of information for the 
constituency, consolidates the collected information to 
identify similar attacks, artifacts, vulnerability exploits, 
trends, and patterns; develop a mitigation strategy for 
potential threats; bring constituents together to act as a 
unit against the cyber threats or crimes. 
 
This component covers the whole incidence’s life cycle 
(Figure 2) [5]. 
 
2624
 Fig. 2. Incident Handling Life Cycle (adapted from Ruefle et al. [5]) 
 
8) Knowledge Sharing (guidance, advisories): 3C-CSIRT 
shares technical guidance and advisories that form a 
precautionary step for the constituency’s systems or 
networks from cyber intrusion activities. A CSIRT is not 
something like operating in a vacuum, but it must operate in 
the context of a complex sociotechnical environment or 
system [9]. Therefore, 3C-CSIRT should share its practical 
experience regarding cyber incidents, vulnerabilities or other 
security issues with its constituencies as well as with other 
external CSIRTs, either locally or internationally, for better 
cooperation and coordination. However, sharing or 
exchanging information and cooperation depends on the 
available trust models they may have with each other [9]. 
9) Security Related Information Dissemination:3C-CSIRT 
has a website through which all the constituencies can share 
security-related information such as recommended tools, 
security patches, software updates, best practices, 
vulnerabilities, and incidents in English as well as in their 
native language for better understanding. 
10) Awareness Building: 3C-CSIRT provides awareness 
programs for all constituencies by arranging seminars, 
briefings on the definition of security issues, effects on 
society and economy as well as precautionary measures for 
prevention purposes. The 3C-CSIRT uses media 
broadcasting and social media for security awareness 
purposes. 
11) Education/Training: The lack of technical expertise 
and talent for a long time within the constituent’s 
organization may severely damage the respective 
organizations’ ability to develop and implement the policy 
[23] and combat the cybercrimes effectively and efficiently. 
Therefore, the 3C-CSIRT provides training programs to 
members in the constituency. This includes training classes 
on security issues, incident response issues, tutorials on the 
type of attacks and its solution strategies, and vulnerability 
trends. The 3C-CSIRT also trains its technical staff by 
sending them to foreign countries for international 
certification courses. 
12) Penetration Testing and Audit: 3C-CSIRT provides 
Penetration Testing and Audit services on the request of 
constituencies. These services include simulation tests on 
systems and networks to identify flaws in the systems or 
networks. Before conducting penetration tests, both the 3C-
CSIRT and constituency, sign service level agreements for 
legal purposes. The 3C-CSIRT can conduct security audits 
in constituencies based on international (e.g., ISO, COBIT) 
or local security standards. 3C-CSIRT provides an audit 
report to the constituency in order to identify the weak points 
or violations of standards. A security audit is compulsory for 
all constituencies of 3C-CSIRT and should be conducted 
once a year. The audit can identify risk level of systems, 
networks, and applications in order to assist in reducing, 
preventing or mitigating risks. 
13) Monitoring: 3C-CSIRT monitors the constituency’s 
networks by ensuring that the operational security of its data 
system is adequately monitored for security anomalies. It 
monitors all websites in the .af domain for defacement, 
collects information from internet traffic entering the 
constituency’s network for gaining situational awareness of 
intruders by analyzing the traffic of the constituencies 
through the distributed network intrusion detection system 
based on the open source tool called “SNORT.” 
14) Translation Service: As a non-English speaking 
country, Afghanistan can benefit from translation services 
meant for dissemination, awareness and knowledge sharing 
(guidance, advisories) purposes. 
15 3C-CSIRT Resources: Resources such as staff, 
equipment, and infrastructure need to be considered. 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for emergency 
communication, handling media interactions, incident 
reporting, sensitive data storage, and record keeping/incident 
tracking can support 3C-CSIRT’s incident handling policies. 
Staff includes the steering committee, manager, technical 
staff and non-technical staff. The steering committee 
consists of heads of ISO, CIO, IT and CSO in the 
constituencies. The constituencies must be large enough and 
have branches or offices that cover more than half of 
Afghanistan. The 3C-CSIRT comprises staff with skills and 
expertise in all types of systems and platforms supported by 
the constituency. The manager should control and manage 
3C-CSIRT operations and report to the Steering Committee. 
The role and responsibility of each staff in the 3C-CSRIT 
should be clearly defined. 
16 Equipment: equipment includes furniture, computer 
equipment (hardware, software), stationary, test lab, 
transportation, and communication equipment (telephone, 
cell phone, and fax). 
17) Infrastructure: infrastructure provides a secure 
environment for routine work, which includes office, 
physical security, digital security systems (CCTV), universal 
power supply (UPS) system, power generator, secure 
communication mechanism, tracking system, repository 
system, web services, backup system, monitoring system 
(IDS, IPS, Firewall), System and Network protection as well 
as Scanning software, which the 3C-CSIRT security team 
can utilize the infrastructure of the respective constituencies. 
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18) Funding strategy: a funding strategy is based on 
compulsory and non-compulsory constituencies contributing 
some part of their annual security budget to the national 
CSIRT. The government should take the initiative and 
encourage ministries, financial institutions and other public 
and private organizations by defining or explaining the role, 
responsibilities and importance of national CSIRTs to 
participate and contribute some part of their security budget 
to the national CSIRT in order to combat and defend the 
cyberspace of Afghanistan in an effective and efficient 
manner. Compulsory constituencies including critical 
sectors, the national bank, and the government must provide 
funds to the national CSIRT at any cost. The non-
compulsory entities are the remaining sectors that need the 
services of the national CSIRT. According to this strategy, 
the steering committee and the security team members 
should be paid by the respective constituencies. 
IV. CONCLUSION  
This study attempted to overcome the shortcomings in the 
constituency as well as the services and funding strategy of 
Afghanistan’s computer emergency response team by 
proposing the 3C-CSIRT organizational model to 
accomplish a Sustainable National Cyber Security Incident 
Response Team. Results showed the model’s suitability and 
potential in managing cybersecurity activities, specifically 
from the Afghanistan context. For future research, some data 
collection methods, such as on-site observations, face-to-
face interviews, and a detailed content analysis could be 
conducted to validate the proposed model further. 
Investigations on other components of CSIRT could provide 
a deeper insight into cybersecurity operations. 
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